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raised in this appeal include Utah R. App. P. 11(e) (2); Utah R. 
App. P. 24(h); Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981); Cox v. 
Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Rawlinas, 829 
P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1992); State v. $9,199.00, 791 P.2d 2213 
(Utah App. 1990); 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 896 
(1990). Citations will occur in the text of Defendant's Brief. 
Certain of the authorities referred to in this Brief are 
reproduced, in their entirety, in the addendums of the Brief of 
the Respondents and the Brief of the Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal was taken by the plaintiff, Carolyn Endrody 
("Plaintiff"), from a Judgment and Decree entered on October 
3rd, 1994, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for 
Iron County, State of Utah, by the Honorable J. Philip Eves. 
The case is essentially a divorce case, involving issues of 
property division and alimony. In addition, the Plaintiff 
claims that she is entitled to a distribution of the assets of 
the Endrody Trust. 
Plaintiff has failed to show, by citation to the record or 
otherwise, that the issues raised in her Brief were preserved 
at the trial court level, as required by Rule 24(a)(5) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In addition, Defendant/ 
Appellee Laszlo Endrody, Jr. ("Defendant") disputes the facts 
set forth under the heading "Statement of the Case" in 
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Plaintiff's Brief. These facts misstate, mischaracterize, and 
take out of context the evidence placed before the court at 
trial. Accordingly, to help address any issues that Plaintiff 
may have raised in this case and answer Plaintiff's Brief, 
Defendant will explain the facts that were proven and fully 
documented during the trial. 
Properties in Question 
1. The Endrody Ranch - 643.77 acres with water 
2. The Home in Cedar City, Utah 
3. The Home at 3 600 North, Enoch, Utah 
4. The Home in Garden Park, Enoch, Utah 
5. The five (5) acres in Enoch, Utah 
6. Cattle of Laszlo Endrody, Jr.; contempt finding 
7. Farm Equipment 
8. Endrody Trucking 
9. Antenuptial Agreement 
10. Retirement 
11. Income & Debt 
1. The Ranch was purchased by LASZLO ENDRODY, SR., and MATILDA 
ENDRODY, Defendant's parents, for $80,000 in 1970. They paid 
$25,000 down and made all the payments until the note was paid 
in full. The Ranch included 643.77 acres with water rights, 
wells, fences, ranch buildings, corrals and pumps. 
Defendant, LASZLO ENDRODY, JR., was deeded one-third (1/3) 
interest with Full Rights of Survivorship with the 
understanding that he will bring his cattle in from Nevada and 
rent the Farm Land from his parents. He was to farm the land 
and he would eventually inherit the Ranch. 
Defendant's parents purchased their home, a double-wide house 
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trailer, permanently installed and roofed over. They drilled a 
third well, installed garden sprinklers, built garage, horse 
coral and landscaped. They spent $45,000 in 1970. Defendant's 
mother, MATILDA ENDRODY, still resides on the Ranch. 
Defendant's parents worked this Ranch for twenty-two (22) 
years, full time. Defendant worked the Ranch six (6) months of 
each year from 1970 to 1975. From 1975 to 1979, Defendant came 
to the Ranch one (1) month each year. After 1979 Defendant 
worked the Ranch five (5) months each year. PATTY and BILL 
HEINZ worked the Ranch three (3) years, full time. PAUL 
McGARVEY (Grandson) worked the Ranch eleven (11) years while he 
lived with his grandparents. LES D. ENDRODY worked the Ranch 
when needed. 
Ten (10) years ago on October 5, 1984, LASZLO ENDRODY, SR. 
and MATILDA ENDRODY formed the Endrody Trust as Grantors. 
Defendant quit-claimed his one-third (1/3) interest to them by 
signing the deed over in exchange for his shares and his 
children's shares in the Trust. Defendant was appointed as the 
first Trustee. The beneficiaries were the family members that 
helped the Grantors the most; later, all family members were 
recognized and received shares. 
Grantors retained the right to cancel the Trust at any time 
during their lives, should they desire. 
Defendant, LASZLO ENDRODY, JR., became the first Trustee. 
While serving as Trustee, he managed the Trust in accordance 
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with the Trust Agreement under the watchful eyes of both 
Grantors. Grantor, LASZLO, SR., kept the books and Grantor, 
MATILDA ENDRODY, is still helping with the bills for second 
Trustee, PATTY HEINZ. 
It was never established at the trial how much money Grantors 
spent towards the improvements or how much cash the Trust 
started with or how much of their own funds they were feeding 
into the Ranch. 
After this lawsuit against the Trust started, Defendant was 
asked by the beneficiaries to step down from being Trustee. 
Dr. Bruce McGarvey, the appointed stand-by Trustee, could not 
take over due to his job in Canada. PATTY R. HEINZ was then 
elected as Trustee. Trust Attorney, W. KENT CORRY, conducted 
the election. Judge J. Philip Eves, Fifth District Court of 
Iron County, determined that she was properly appointed as 
Trustee. 
2. The home in Cedar City, Utah, was purchased by Defendant 
and Plaintiff and deeded to their two (2) children, MICHAEL A. 
ENDRODY and LINDA S. ENDRODY. Defendant and Plaintiff became 
the Trustees for the minor children. 
Plaintiff wanted the home in her children's names to bring 
them even with Defendant's three (3) children that owned cattle 
and other assets. 
Later, when the Trust was formed, Plaintiff wanted to put the 
home into the Trust. For this she received seventy (70) shares 
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(newly formed). This brought Plaintiff and her two (2) 
children even with Defendant's children from his first 
marriage. 
The home then became Trust property, deeded to the Trust. 
The Trust paid the taxes, improvements, insurance and 
maintenance. 
Ten (10) years ago, Plaintiff gave her half (1/2) of this 
house to her minor children along with Defendant's half. Later 
she granted the home to the Endrody Trust. No one twisted her 
arm to do so. At the same time she demonstrated that she fully 
approved and acknowledged the Endrody Trust. 
3. The Enoch home on 3 600 North was purchased by the Endrody 
Trust and was deeded to the Trust. The Trust paid the taxes, 
insurance, improvements and made the payments. 
The home was rented out to Defendant and family for $850.00 
per month. 
The reason Plaintiff was evicted from the home after the 
divorce was that she would not pay rent. The rent was $85 0.0 0 
per month. This is an eighteen (18) room house. Plaintiff 
rented out part of the house and kept the rent money, outright 
stealing from the Trust. This home was never hers. The Trust 
is still making the house payments. The rent was needed to 
make the payments. To stay in that house rent-free for three 
(3) years was not fair. That is why the trial Judge awarded 
one-half of the rent for two (2) years--$10,200.00--to be paid 
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by Plaintiff to the Trust. Defendant was ordered to pay the 
other half. 
4. The home in Garden Park was purchased by the Trust and 
was deeded to the Trust. The Trust paid the taxes, insurance, 
improvements, maintenance and the house payments. Basically, 
this was to be rental property to be rented out to 
beneficiaries and others. 
When PATTY HEINZ became Trustee, she sold the house before 
the Trust and the beneficiaries were pulled into this divorce 
case. The money from the sale of the home went back into the 
Trust Account. There was no order against the Trust not to 
sell. 
5. The five (5) acres in Enoch, Utah, were bought by the 
Trust and deeded into the Trust. The Trust paid the taxes, 
insurance and for improvements. 
6. CATTLE OF DEFENDANT. The original herd was trucked in 
from Nevada, together with PATTY R. ENDRODY'S cattle, LES D. 
ENDRODY'S cattle and ROBERT S. ENDRODY'S cattle. 
In 1975, at the time of the marriage, Defendant owned two 
hundred (200) cows, their one hundred eighty (180) calves, some 
bulls and replacement heifers, and twenty (20) steers, on feed. 
During the marriage, Defendant purchased several bulls. 
These became marital assets. The cow herd slowly diminished 
during the marriage until the final sale when Defendant ran out 
of feed and had no funds to buy any, and no hired help to feed 
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the animals. 
Defendant asked his attorney to advise the trial court that 
Defendant ran out of feed and had no funds to buy any. The 
attorney failed to do so but advised Defendant to sell. Later 
the attorney told Judge J. Philip Eves that it was his fault 
they were sold. The proceeds went to reducing debt and MICHAEL 
ENDRODY'S medical bills. 
As stated before, Plaintiff received $10,000.00 in cash and a 
$10,000.00 Judgment to be paid to her by Defendant. 
7. EQUIPMENT ON THE FARM. In 1970 when Defendant started 
farming in Utah, he purchased $40,000 worth of equipment. The 
$40,000 came mainly from two (2) homes he sold in California. 
The residue came from a previous marriage and from seven (7) 
years of Defendant's service in Vietnam waters. In 1975 
Defendant had a full set of farm equipment. During the 
marriage it was upgraded and new equipment added. Judge J. 
Philip Eves divided the equipment. 
In December 1993 after the trial, Plaintiff had a meeting 
with Defendant. Plaintiff assured Defendant that she had no 
intention to appeal this divorce case and asked Defendant for 
her equipment. She sold the equipment in 1993 and netted 
$43,000.00. She promised to pay her rent and the one-half 
(1/2) of the medical costs ordered by Judge Eves. However, 
once the equipment was sold, she did not pay anything as 
promised. 
10 
8. ENDRODY TRUCKING. Defendant purchased a freightiiner and 
two (2) hay trailers during the marriage in order to haul our 
products to California. To limit liability with the big truck, 
the Trust formed Endrody Trucking, a Utah Corporation. The 
Trustee of Endrody Trucking became the President. Plaintiff 
was one of the founding Directors. Endrody Trust purchased 
51,000 shares for $51,000.00. Defendant transferred the 
freightiiner, the two trailers, an international cattle truck 
and a 1984 Dodge with a snowplow. Total value $16,000.00 for 
16,000 shares. Shares were divided as follows: 
LASZLO ENDRODY, JR. 4,000 Shares 
PLAINTIFF 2,000 Shares 
MICHAEL A. ENDRODY 2,000 Shares 
LINDA S. ENDRODY 2,000 Shares 
LES D. ENDRODY 2,000 Shares 
ROBERT S. ENDRODY 2,000 Shares 
PATTY E. HEINZ 2,000 Shares 
Judge J. Philip Eves ordered Defendant to transfer one 
thousand (1,000) shares to Plaintiff. This way, Defendant will 
have three thousand (3,000) shares and Plaintiff will have 
three thousand (3,000 shares). When PATTY HEINZ took over the 
Endrody Trust as Trustee, in our annual meeting she 
automatically took over as President of Endrody Trucking. 
9. ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT. The Antenuptial Agreement should 
speak for itself. As noted in the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision, the court analyzed the Antenuptial Agreement 
carefully. The court invalidated the provisions it thought 
unfair and upheld the rest. 
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10. RETIREMENT. Defendant planned retirement long before he 
was served with this divorce case. Defendant held on to his 
job until his third term as Secretary/Treasurer with 10 MM&P 
Pilots Division, Panama Canal Pilots Branch, expired. He did 
not seek re-election. The reasons for retirement were 
explained at trial, and are set out below in Argument II. 
11. INCOME AND DEBT. The statement that Plaintiff had no 
medical insurance is not valid. In Government Service she had 
the choice to keep her insurance, subject to paying a premium, 
the same as Defendant. Plaintiff also received $10,000.00 in 
cash from Defendant and another $10,000.00 was ordered to be 
paid when Defendant can. She has been paid $2,371.57 to date. 
Plaintiff received during the case, cash 
A Judgment for additional 
For Attorney's fees 
A Judgment for additional 
A Judgment for additional 
Plaintiff's half of the Equipment 
The Trust-owned Cadillac 
Plaintiff sold the Children's Piano 
Plaintiff rented out the trust-owned home 
Total 77,350 
All of Plaintiff's medical bills were cleared up in 1990 in a 
$50,000.00 loan that Defendant obtained from Captain Mark 
McKim. Defendant borrowed $10,000.00 from Endrody Trucking. 
At the time of the trial, Defendant owed $29,000.00 to Endrody 
Trust. 
It is speculation on Mr. Park's part that: 
(a) Plaintiff will not receive anything out of her shares. 
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She will receive just as much as Defendant from any dividends 
that may be paid out in the future. 
(b) Defendant will resume as Trustee after this case is 
finally put to rest. The present Trustee is handling all of 
her responsibilities in accordance with the Trust Agreement. 
Why should any beneficiary request a change? 
FALSE STATEMENTS IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
1. The statement that "the Defendant created an entity known 
as the Endrody Trust of 1984" is a false statement. The 
Grantors created the Trust, not the beneficiaries. 
2. The statement that "the parties purchased three homes" is 
a false statement. The parties only purchased the Cedar City 
house for MICHAEL and LINDA. The Trust purchased the other 
two. At the time these houses were purchased, Defendant did 
not make the kind of money that could have purchased three 
homes in a relatively short period of time. 
3. The statement that "Plaintiff and Defendant accumulated 
$800,000 in marital assets during 17 years of marriage" is 
false. This would be approximately $50,000.00 per year for the 
sixteen years they were together. It is a matter of record 
that for the first two years of the marriage, Defendant made 
$24,000.00 per year. He purchased a house trailer for his 
family (now worth $500.00). The next two years he made 
$38,000.00 per year, then $42,000.00 for two years. Then for 
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two years there was a wage freeze for government workers during 
Reagan's administration. 
Defendant purchased the home for his children in Cedar City. 
Defendant remodeled that home. After 1979, Defendant 
maintained two homes, one in Utah and one in Panama. Defendant 
purchased a 1978 Cordoba for Plaintiff and two new trucks for 
Defendant. Car in Panama. The home in Utah was fully 
furnished, as was the home in Panama. Purchase of round-trip 
airfare to Utah was made every ten (10) weeks. Defendant 
purchased a hay hauling truck, paid tremendous medical bills, 
and purchased a new tractor. Defendant made good money as a 
senior pilot and he did farm. However, since he was away seven 
(7) months of the year, he paid more wages than normal to farm 
workers, compared to farms where the owners were there. 
Defendant upgraded equipment when necessary. 
4. The statement that "Plaintiff and Defendant took an 
$80,000 piece of property and used the income from the 
Defendant's employment over a period of 15 years to turn that 
piece of property into an $437,000 asset which Defendant 
treated as his own and knew that he would inherit". This is 
all false. First, all of the $80,000.00 was in 1970 dollars. 
That is half of the $437,000.00 in 1993. The $437,000.00 
includes the Grantors' home and all their improvements (about 
$45,000.00 in 1970 dollars). Most improvements were between 
1970 and 1975. 
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Defendant could not have purchased three houses out of his 
own wages in the time frame the houses were purchased in. To 
buy the 3 600 North house, a large down payment was required. 
The Trustee picked up a loan on the now Trust-owned home on 
1225 West, made the down payment and picked up a note for 
$40,000.00 from seller at 10%. The Trust then invested 
$51,000.00 in Endrody Trucking. MATILDA McGARVEY and BRUCE 
McGARVEY deposited $22,000.00 into their Trust savings account. 
Using most of the savings in the Trust accounts, the loan on 
the 1225 West home was paid off. Forty-eight thousand dollars 
($48,000) was borrowed from Endrody Trucking. The 408 Garden 
home was purchased with a bank loan. The 3 600 North home was 
paid off. The loan on the 4 08 and 5AC Enoch remained. The 
Trust then purchased 150 HP tractor and harvester. Five (5) 
acres was freed up. One hundred (10 0) acre feet of water 
rights was purchased for the Ranch. A Third Pivot sprinkling 
system was purchased. The main line going to Third Pivot was 
replaced from 6" to 8" main line for 3/4 miles. A loan was 
taken out on 3600 North property. All of the above properties 
were paid off except for the 408 Garden Park home. 
After change of Trustee was made, the 408 Garden Park home 
was sold and the Trust made a payment to Endrody Trucking. The 
loan on the 3600 North home still remains. 
All of the above was covered in the depositions. 
5. The statement that "From the time of the purchase in 1970 
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until 1975 the time of the marriage, the Defendant did not make 
more than $24,000.00 per year and did not have the funds to 
increase the value of the farm property" is false. This was 
not covered at trial, but covered in the depositions. 
Defendant made $38,000.00 per year as a Captain of the S.S. San 
Juan and the S.S. San Pedro for Sea-Land Service, Inc. This 
figure is a three-year average. 
When Defendant accepted a position with the Panama Canal 
Company as a Panama Canal pilot, he took a $14,000.00-a-year 
reduction in income. This is fact and not speculation. 
6. The statement that "The yearly payments were made by 
Defendant until the balance plus interest was paid in full on 
the Ranch" is false. LASZLO, SR., made the payment. The 
Defendant paid rent when the Trust was formed and leased the 
Ranch. Lease Agreement was in evidence. All of the checks 
used by LASZLO, SR., to pay of the Ranch were furnished during 
the discovery process. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Defendant adopts by reference Arguments I, II, and 
III regarding the validity of the Endrody Trust and the 
separate, non-marital, and non-divisible nature of the Trust 
property. 
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II. The detailed evidence shows that any imputation of 
historical income to the Defendant would be wrong because 
Defendant's reduction in employment and income is neither 
voluntary nor temporary. Accordingly, the trial judge's 
decision to award Plaintiff alimony based on Defendant's 
retirement income was not an abuse of discretion. 
III. The trial judge's rulings and acceptance of the 
disposition of the proceeds from the sale of the cattle and of 
the home should be presumed correct, inasmuch as Defendant made 
no improper use of the income, and as Plaintiff has presented 
an incomplete record on appeal in violation of Rule 11(e) (2) of 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IV. Plaintiff misstates the issue. The trial court did not 
find that the Antenuptial Agreement precluded Plaintiff from 
receiving the assets of the marriage; instead, it awarded 
Plaintiff one-half of Defendant's shares in the Trust property. 
Moreover, this is not a worthless award. Plaintiff will 
receive as much as Defendant from the Trust; they share equally 
in its benefits. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has 
upheld a similar award in the context of a farm partnership. 
V. The trial judge's decision to award Plaintiff only 
partial attorney's fees cannot be said to be an abuse of 
discretion because Plaintiff, in violation of Rule 11(e) (2) of 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, failed to set forth the 
complete evidentiary record where the trial court considered 
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evidence on attorney's fees. As a result, the Court should 
presume that the trial judge made adequate findings and did not 
abuse his discretion. 
VI. Defendant should not be forced to pay Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees on appeal. Plaintiff has not provided a 
complete record that refutes the trial judge's decision that 
Plaintiff's need only warranted a partial award of attorney's 
fees. Moreover, Plaintiff's appeal is frivolous and misleading 
and does not warrant an award to her of attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THE ENDRODY TRUST IS A 
VALID TRUST CONTAINING TRUST ASSETS AND NOT MARITAL 
PROPERTY WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, RATIONALLY BASED, 
AND NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Defendant adopts by reference Arguments I, II, 
and III made in the other Defendants/Appellees' brief entitled 
"Brief of Respondents". As explained in that Brief, the trial 
court made detailed findings that the Endrody Trust was valid 
and held its own separate property that was not marital 
property subject to division. The trial court's findings were 
supported by the evidence, squarely within legal precedent, and 
were not an abuse of its discretion. 
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II. THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE 
DOCTRINE OF "IMPUTED INCOME" IS INAPPLICABLE AND THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT IN NO WAY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF ALIMONY BASED ON DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT INCOME 
The trial court's decision to award Plaintiff alimony based 
on Defendant's retirement income was not an abuse of discretion 
because of the clear and uncontroverted evidence of Defendant's 
age, declining physical health, difficult child care 
responsibilities, and his current inability to farm. In 
contrast, the evidence shows that imputation of historical 
income to defendant would be highly inappropriate because 
Defendant's reduction in employment and income is neither 
voluntary nor temporary. 
Plaintiff relies on the case of Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 
(Utah App. 1994) (which Plaintiff incorrectly cited as 841 P.2d 
722) to argue that the trial court should have imputed to 
Defendant his "historical" income rather than his retirement 
income. However, Plaintiff ignores the point noted by the 
very case she cites: the concept of imputed income requires 
first that "a finding is made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed". 869 P.2d at 965. In Cox v. Cox, 
877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 1994), the Court of Appeals emphasized 
that "A court should not impute income for child or spousal 
support until it first determines, xas a threshold matter,' 
that income should be imputed because the [spouse] is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." Id. at 1267 (citing 
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Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis in 
original). 
Plaintiff states that the trial court "chose not to impute 
income to the defendant in spite of overwhelming evidence that 
the defendant was voluntarily under-employed." (Brief of 
Appellant at 21). However, Plaintiff never sets out this 
"overwhelming" evidence. The scattered "facts" that Plaintiff 
supports through cites to the Trial Record deal with such 
issues as Plaintiff's attempt to obtain a secretarial degree 
and the list of medications Plaintiff takes. Plaintiff, 
however, does not cite to facts that deal with the 
voluntariness or involuntariness of Defendant's employment. 
In addition, in assessing spousal support trial courts have 
"appropriately relied on historical income rather than income 
at the time of the divorce where a party xhas experienced a 
temporary decrease in income.'" Cox, 877 P.2d at 1267 (citing 
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985). Plaintiff has 
advanced no facts that would show that Defendant's reduction in 
income is only temporary. 
In contrast, Defendant introduced solid evidence at trial 
(and the trial court took this evidence into account in its 
findings) that Defendant will not be able to return to his 
previous line of work as a Panama Canal Pilot because of his 
age, physical condition, and difficult child care 
responsibilities. In addition, because of the division and 
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sale of the farm equipment, it is highly unlikely that 
Defendant will be able to farm during retirement, as he had 
hoped. Thus, Defendant has introduced evidence that his 
reduction in employment is not voluntary and that his reduction 
in income is not temporary. 
First, Defendant is 63 years old. He did not take an early 
retirement. As a Panama Canal Pilot, he had an eighteen (18) 
year retirement. Defendant retired with nineteen (19) years 
and eleven (11) months of service. 
Second, Defendant's health has become a serious concern, 
especially in light of Defendant's line of work. Defendant has 
had two heart attacks, and it is very risky boarding moving 
ships and climbing pilot ladders (rope ladders). In addition, 
Defendant's eyes have deteriorated to the extent that it is 
very hard for him to see in the distance down a lockwall 700 
feet ahead, especially in a shadow effect. Defendant, as a 
senior pilot, was handling Pana-Max size ships 106 feet in beam 
and driving these ships (mostly tankers) into a 110-foot wide 
lock chamber. This gave him two feet on each side of the 
vessel. This two feet looks like two inches, 700 feet ahead. 
This is called tunnel vision. The vessel is steel and the lock 
chamber is concrete. When steel, weighing 6 0,000 tons, comes 
in contact with concrete, it makes sparks. Tankers have fumes 
on deck and could ignite and cause an explosion that Defendant, 
the ship crew and lock workers may not survive. 
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Defendant took an oath that he would step down when he could 
not perform this job safely. Defendant is a licensed Master 
Mariner and a marine pilot. Federal regulations do not permit 
anyone to second-guess or question his decision to step down. 
The same rules apply to airline pilots: if they don't think 
they can land that bird, they don't take off. 
Defendant has only worked four (4) jobs at sea in the last 
two (2) years. One was for fifteen (15) days, one for twenty-
eight (28) days and two (2) jobs for thirty-five (35) days 
each. Defendant only worked these jobs in order to get the 
additional medical coverage for his children. They are now 
covered until November of 1995. 
Third, Plaintiff does not address Defendant's 
uncontroverted evidence--nor the trial court's finding--that 
Defendant's child care responsibilities seriously undermine his 
ability to seek other employment at sea. The trial court noted 
that although Defendant hopes to return to work in the merchant 
marine, he is "currently caring for and has temporary custody 
of the two teenage children of the parties," and "Michael 
[their son] is very ill." (Memorandum Decision, Addendum "A" 
to Brief of Appellant). Defendant's daughter, Linda, has 
tumors on her ovary and a tumor on her neck. She will probably 
face an operation. Michael Endrody suffers from focal 
segmental glomerulosclerosis. This is a chronic inflammatory 
disease of the kidneys that with time progresses to kidney 
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failure. Michael, now in Redding, California, is waiting for a 
kidney transplant. Plaintiff contributes nothing to the cost 
involved. Michael also suffers from Schizophrenia with 
impaired judgment and communication. He must have care. Yet, 
as the court found, Defendant's taking care of his children 
"would create problems if he were to go back to sea as that 
line of work requires lengthy absences." (Memorandum 
Decision.) In addition, the court noted that "Plaintiff has 
indicated that she is not interested in taking physical custody 
of the children at this time." (Memorandum Decision). 
Plaintiff pushed Michael out of their home and refused to care 
for him. Defendant tried to take Michael with him to Panama 
after the invasion, but it didn't work out. Defendant had to 
care for Michael by hiring a maid to help with the care so 
Defendant could work. The schools in the Canal Zone could not 
handle him. After the decision was given by Commissioner 
Lehman, Defendant had no money to pay the maid and had to let 
her go. Defendant could no longer commute to Utah. He had his 
son with him. Defendant could no longer afford two (2) round-
trip air fares every ten (10) weeks. Defendant had to stay 
full-time in Panama with his son in school. Defendant was 
forced to give up farming. Michael received $230.00 per month 
Social Security from Utah. He should have received $440.00, 
but Plaintiff, out of spite, signed statements at Social 
Security stating that the Endrody Trust is furnishing him free 
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rent and food. This is not true. The Endrody Trust does not 
furnish him with anything other than some supervision from 
Trustee, PATTY HEINZ. She resides in the Redding area. 
Fourth, there comes a time that every working person must 
retire. In retirement most people make less money. Aside from 
the formidable obstacles Defendant faces in returning to work 
at sea, Defendant will not be able to farm during his 
retirement as he had hoped. Defendant planned to farm and make 
$1,000.00 per month. However, the division of the farm 
equipment has precluded Defendant from going back into farming. 
That source of income is gone forever. 
In summary, Defendant has reached (and passed) his age of 
retirement. His heart attacks and declining eyesight make it 
unlikely that he can ever return to his previous line of work. 
Going back to sea in the merchant marines will be extremely 
difficult for him because he has physical custody of two 
children, one with serious medical problems, and Plaintiff is 
not interested in caring for them. Finally, Defendant will not 
be able to farm during his retirement as he had hoped. 
In sum, the above facts, presented at trial, do not suggest 
the "overwhelming" evidence of voluntary underemployment 
Plaintiff claims. Instead, this evidence indicates that the 
trial court could have easily found that Defendant's drop in 
employment and income resulted from his age, deteriorating 
health, and onerous child care responsibilities and was 
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anything but voluntary. In addition, Defendant is now unable--
not unwilling--to farm, as he cannot farm without the necessary 
equipment. As a result, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant 
even meets the "threshold" finding of involuntariness required 
for the application of the imputation of income doctrine. Cox, 
877 P.2d at 1267. Moreover, the evidence indicates that 
Defendant's decrease in income is not temporary, so that 
imputation of historical income would be inappropriate. Id. 
In short, the trial court's decision to award Plaintiff alimony 
from Defendant's retirement income was supported by clear and 
detailed evidence and was in no way an abuse of discretion. 
III. DEFENDANT DID ACCOUNT FOR PROPERTY SOLD DURING THE 
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court found the defendant in contempt of court for 
selling the cattle, but seems to have found the disposition of 
the proceeds from the cattle was made correctly. Plaintiff has 
failed to provide the appellate court with a complete 
transcript of the trial court proceedings in which the trial 
court made its finding that the Defendant's penalty for 
contempt was to be $810, the amount of money that the court 
found the Plaintiff reasonably incurred in costs and attorney's 
fees. The issue of the Defendant's penalty for contempt was 
heard on November 29, 1993, an additional day of 
trial/evidentiary hearing on the limited issues left unresolved 
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by the trial court's Memorandum Decision. The transcript of 
this hearing, as contained in the trial record, contains only 
the trial court Judge's rulings and excludes the presentation 
of any evidence or any other proceedings before the court on 
that date. 
However, Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure requires that 
[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding 
or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a 
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated 
to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant 
portions of the transcript. 
(emphasis added). Plaintiff seems to be urging on appeal that 
the trial court's penalty for contempt did not reflect the 
proceeds from the sale of the cattle that Plaintiff ostensibly 
lost,--i.e., that the trial court's treatment of the sale of 
the cattle was "unsupported by or contrary to the evidence". 
Therefore, Plaintiff should have included in the record a 
transcript of the evidentiary hearings where any evidence on 
this issue was heard. Because Plaintiff did not provide a 
complete or adequate record on appeal, this Court should 
presume that the trial court's decisions regarding the sale of 
the cattle were based on sufficient facts and evidence. State 
v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1992); State v. $9,199.00, 
791 P.2d 2213 (Utah App. 1990); Horton v. Gem State Mutual of 
Utah, 794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990; Sampson v. Richins, 770 
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P.2d 998 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). 
Finally, even if Plaintiff's failure to provide an adequate 
record could be ignored, the trial judge's decision can be 
understood by the fact that Defendant's attorney told the trial 
judge that it was his fault that the cattle were sold. 
Defendant had asked his attorney to advise the trial court that 
Defendant ran out of feed and had no funds to buy any. The 
attorney failed to do so but advised Defendant to sell. Under 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the Court of 
Appeals may resonably imply any necessary findings which may 
not have been stated by the trial court if the Court determines 
that the trial court's findings do not provide adequate detail 
or specificity. 
Next, Plaintiff contends that the trial court's Findings of 
Fact and Memorandum Decision did not account for the proceeds 
of the home sold by the Trustee for the Endrody Trust. Once 
again, Rule 11(e)(2) of the Rule of Appellate Procedure 
required Plaintiff to provide a complete record because of her 
challenge of the evidence in this matter. Plaintiff did not do 
this. However, Plaintiff's argument also fails because it was 
not Defendant who sold the home or collected the proceeds. The 
Endrody Trust, a third party, owned the home, sold the home, 
and received the proceeds. As a result, Plaintiff herself has 
received the proceeds from the sale of the home--they are 
reflected in the value of the Trust shares she holds (which are 
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of equal value to the shares that the Defendant holds). In 
short, Plaintiff's demand that the trial court should have 
asked the Defendant to account for the proceeds of the home is 
misguided. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DETERMINE THAT THE ANTENUPTIAL 
AGREEMENT PRECLUDED PLAINTIFF FROM RECEIVING ASSETS 
ACCUMULATED DURING THE MARRIAGE BUT INSTEAD MADE A VALID 
AWARD TO PLAINTIFF OF ONE-HALF OF DEFENDANT'S SHARES IN 
THE ENDRODY TRUST 
Plaintiff's statement of this "issue" and its final position 
misstates and blatantly ignores the detailed findings of the 
trial court regarding the Antenuptial Agreement in its 
Memorandum Decision. The trial court did not determine that 
the Antenuptial Agreement precluded the Plaintiff from 
receiving assets during the marriage. Instead, the trial court 
invalidated provisions of the Agreement it found unfair and 
divided the Trust shares accordingly. Originally Defendant had 
4,000 shares in Endrody Trucking and Plaintiff had 2,000; now 
Plaintiff and Defendant each own 3,000 shares in Endrody 
Trucking. 
This is not a "worthless award". Plaintiff will receive as 
much as Defendant from the Trust. Moreover, a similar award 
was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in the context of a 
farming partnership where there was no market for the 
fractional partnership interest awarded to the wife. In Berry 
v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court 
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reversed the trial court's decree that the husband should 
purchase the wife's interest and that the wife should have a 
judgment against the husband if he failed to do so. The Utah 
Supreme Court commended the trial judge's efforts to fashion a 
means by which the wife's interest in the partnership might be 
liquidated, recognizing that it would be beneficial to both 
parties to have the wife entirely severed from the farming 
operation. However, the Court pointed out the lack of a market 
for the fractional interest and the unfairness of creating a 
burden for the husband because of his financial condition. The 
Court also rejected the Plaintiff's suggestion that the husband 
persuade the other partners to sell a portion of the land. "We 
commend that suggestion to the defendant but cannot impose it 
upon him as an obligation inasmuch as under our partnership 
laws . . . neither plaintiff nor defendant can force a sale of 
specific partnership property." Id. at 70. 
Similarly, the Plaintiff in the instant case was awarded a 
fractional interest in separate Trust property. As noted in 
Respondents' Brief, the evidence indicates that the Endrody 
Trust is a valid trust that has met the required formalities 
and has conducted its affairs separately from the affairs of 
Defendant. Accordingly, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant can 
force the court to invalidate or set aside the Trust or force a 
sale of Trust property. As noted in 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and 
Separation, § 896 (1983), "[sjome property ostensibly owned by 
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divorcing spouses may not be divisible because it is neither 
marital nor separate property but is the property of a third 
person." 
In contrast to Plaintiff's contention, Defendant does not 
control the trust; he is a beneficiary of the Trust and is the 
owner of certain shares, subject to the provisions of the Trust 
agreement (as is Plaintiff). As a result, this case should be 
governed by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Berry. 
The Court held that it was inequitable to require the husband 
to purchase the wife's interest, and stated that if and when 
the defendant husband's salary materially increased (or his 
debts reduced), the trial court under its continuing 
jurisdiction could reexamine the problem. Berry, 635 P.2d at 
70. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO PLAINTIFF 
SHOULD BE PRESUMED SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff's brief suggests that the trial court did not 
support its discretionary award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff 
with adequate findings. However, once again Plaintiff has 
failed to provide the appellate court with a complete 
transcript of the necessary trial court proceedings pursuant to 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, 
the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all 
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evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the 
court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's 
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the 
transcript. 
The issue of attorney's fees also came on November 29, 1993, 
the additional day of trial/evidentiary hearing on the limited 
issues left unresolved by the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision. The transcript of this hearing, as contained in the 
trial record, contains only the trial court Judge's rulings and 
excludes the presentation of any evidence or any other 
proceedings before the court. 
If Plaintiff wished to urge on appeal that the trial court's 
award of attorney's fees was "unsupported by or contrary to the 
evidence," Plaintiff was required to include in the record a 
transcript of the evidentiary hearings where any evidence on 
attorney's fees was heard. Because Plaintiff did not provide a 
complete or adequate record on appeal, this Court should 
presume that the trial court's ruling as to attorney's fees was 
based on sufficient facts and evidence. State v. Rawlinqs, 829 
P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1992); State v. $9,199.00, 791 P.2d 2213 
(Utah App. 1990); Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 794 P.2d 
847 (Utah App. 1990; Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). 
Next, Plaintiff's Brief attempts to make much of the fact 
that "most" of the interim orders were attributable to 
Defendant. As an example, Plaintiff insinuates that Defendant 
31 
unreasonably attempted to evict her from the "family home." 
Plaintiff does not mention that the Trust owned the home, that 
Plaintiff had failed to make rental payments to the trust that 
were needed to make the payments on the home, nor that 
Plaintiff had rented out part of the trust-owned home for her 
own benefit. Thus, Defendant's actions were hardly 
"unwarranted" conduct, as Plaintiff claims. 
VI. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff requests attorney's fees on appeal, citing a need 
for attorney's fees established at the trial level. However, 
as noted in Argument V, Plaintiff has not provided the Court 
with a complete record, so that it is impossible to tell what 
evidence the trial court relied on below in its decision to 
award attorney's fees. Moreover, Plaintiff's Brief has been so 
twisted and loaded with false statements and outright 
speculation that it cannot possibly warrant any more attorney's 
fees to be taken from Defendant. This lawsuit is now in its 
fourth year. The divorce took thirty minutes. Defendant acted 
as his own attorney throughout the trial. Plaintiff had two 
attorneys and expects Defendant to pay for them. Any more fees 
of any kind would drive this Defendant into bankruptcy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts of this case, the foregoing arguments, and 
the evidence presented to the trial court, Defendant 
respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals affirm the 
decision of the Fifth Judicial District Court, as reflected by 
the trial court's Memorandum Decision, its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment and Decree. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED fchi^O^r/ day of June, 1995. 
llrtzJx 
LASZLO .ENDRODY, JR . , 
Pro S e / D e f e n d a n t / A p ^ ^ l l e e 
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